Table of Contents, Chapter IV, Chapter VI
After a third lineup at about 7:40 p.m., Oswald was returned to Fritz' office. About an hour later, after further questioning, Oswald's fingerprints and palmprints were taken and a paraffin test (see app. XI) administered in Fritz' office, after which the questioning resumed. At 11:26 p.m. Fritz signed the complaint charging Oswald with the murder of President Kennedy. Shortly after midnight, detectives took Oswald to the basement assembly room for an appearance of several minutes before members of the press. At about 12:20 a.m. Oswald was delivered to the jailer who placed him in a maximum security cell on the fifth floor. His cell was the center one in a block of three cells that were separated from the remainder of the jail area. The cells on either side of Oswald were empty and a guard was nearby whenever Oswald was present. Shortly after 1:30 a.m. Oswald was brought to the identification bureau on the fourth floor and arraigned before Justice of the Peace Johnston, this time for the murder President Kennedy.
Questioning resumed in Fritz' office on Saturday morning at about 10:25 a.m., and the session lasted nearly an hour and 10 minutes. Oswald was then returned to his cell for an hour, and at 12:35 p.m. he was brought back to Fritz' office for an additional half-hour of questioning. From 1:10 to 1:30 p.m., Oswald's wife and mother visited him in the fourth floor visiting area; at 1:40 p.m. he tempted to call an attorney in New York. He appeared in another lineup at, 2:15 p.m. At 2:45 p.m., with Oswald's consent, a member of the identification bureau obtained fingernail scrapings and specimens of hair from him. He returned to the fourth floor at 3:30 p.m. for a 10-minute visit with his brother, Robert.
Between 4 and 4:30 p.m., Oswald made two telephone calls to Mrs. Ruth Paine at her home in Irving; at about 5:30 p.m. he was visited by the president of the Dallas Bar Association with whom he spoke for about 5 minutes. From 6 to 7:15 p.m. Oswald was interrogated once again in Captain Fritz' office and then returned to his cell. At 8 p.m. he called the Paine residence again and asked to speak to his wife, but Mrs. Paine told him that his wife was no longer there.
Oswald was signed out of jail at 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, and taken
to Captain Fritz' office for a final round of questioning. The transfer party
left Fritz' office at about 11:15 a.m.; at 11:21 a.m. Oswald was shot. He was
declared dead at Parkland Hospital at 1:07 p.m.
Captain Fritz' office, within which the interrogations took place, was a
small room, 14 feet by 9 and a half feet in size. In addition to the policemen
guarding the prisoner, those present usually included Dallas detectives,
investigators from the FBI and the Secret Service, and occasionally other
officials, particularly a post office inspector and the US. marshal. (See
statements in app. XI.) As many as seven or eight people crowded into the small
office. In all, more than 25 different persons participated in or were present
at some time during interrogations. Captain Fritz, who conducted most of the
interrogations, was frequently called from the room. He said, "I don't believe
there was any time when I went through a very long period without having to step
to the door, or step outside, to get a report from some pair of officers, or to
give them additional assignments." In his absence, others present would
occasionally question Oswald.
The interrogators differ on whether the confusion prevailing in the main
third floor corridor penetrated Fritz' office and affected the atmosphere
within. Oswald's processions through the third floor corridor, described more
fully below, tended, in Fritz' opinion, to keep Oswald upset, and the remarks
and questions of newsmen sometimes caused him to become annoyed. Despite the
confusion that frequently prevailed, Oswald remained calm most of the time
during the interrogations. According to Captain Fritz:
You know I didn't have trouble with him. If we would just talk to him
quietly like we are talking right now, we talked all right until I asked him a
question that meant something, every time I asked him a question that meant
something, that would produce evidence he immediately told me he wouldn't tell
me about it and he seemed to anticipate what I was going to ask.
Special Agent James W. Bookhout, who represented the FBI at most of the
interrogations, stated, "I think generally you might say any-time that you asked
a question that would be pertinent to the investigation, that would be the type
of question he would refuse to discuss." The number of people in the
interrogation room and the tumultuous atmosphere throughout the third floor made
it difficult for the interrogators to gain Oswald's confidence and to encourage
him to be truthful. As Chief Curry has recognized in his testimony, "we were
violating every principle of interrogation... it was just against all principles
of good interrogation practice."
Before the first questioning session on Friday afternoon, Fritz warned Oswald
that he was not compelled to make any statement and that statements he did make
could be used against him. About 5 hours later, he was arraigned for the Tippit
murder and within an additional 6 and a half hours he was arraigned for the
murder of President Kennedy. On each occasion the justice of the peace advised
Oswald of his right to obtain counsel and the right to remain
silent. Oswald. Well, I was questioned by Judge[Johnston]. However, I protested
at that time that I was not allowed legal representation during that very short
and sweet hearing. I really don't know what the situation is about. Nobody has
told me anything except that I am accused of, of, murdering a policeman. I know
nothing more than that and I do request someone to come forward to give me legal
assistance.
Q. Did you kill the President? By the time Chief Curry returned to the building in the middle of the
afternoon from Love Field where he had escorted President Johnson from Parkland
Hospital, he found that "there was just pandemonium on the third floor." The
news representatives, he testified:
...were jammed into the north hall of the third floor, which are the
offices of the criminal investigation division.
The television trucks, there were several of them around the city hall.
I went into my administrative offices, I saw cables coming through the
administrative assistant office and through the deputy chief of traffic through
his office, and running through the hall they had a live TV set up on the third
floor, and it was a bedlam of confusion.
According to Special Agent Winston G. Lawson of the Secret Service:
At least by 6 or 7 o'clock ...[the reporters and cameramen] were quite in
evidence up and down the corridors, cameras on the tripods, the sound equipment,
people with still cameras, motion picture-type hand cameras, all kinds of people
with tape recorders, and they were trying to interview people, anybody that
belonged in police headquarters that might know anything about Oswald... The
corridor became so jammed that policemen and newsmen had to push and shove if
they wanted to get through, stepping over cables, wires, and tripods. The crowd
in the hallway was so dense that District Attorney Wade found it a "strain to
get the door open" to get. into the homicide office. According to Lawson, "You
had to literally fight your way through the people to get up and down the
corridor." A witness who was escorted into the homicide offices on Saturday
afternoon related that he tried to get by the reporters, stepping over
television cables and you couldn't hardly get by, they would grab you and wanted
to know what you were doing down here, even with the detectives one in front and
one behind you.
The television cameras continued to record the scene on the third floor
as some of the newsmen kept vigil through the night. According to some reporters and policemen, people who appeared to be
unauthorized were present on the third floor after security procedures were
instituted, and video tapes seem to confirm their observations. Jack Ruby was
present on the third floor on Friday night. Assistant Chief of Police N. T.
Fisher testified that even on Saturday "anybody could come up with a plausible
reason for going to one of the third floor bureaus and was able to get in."
On most occasions, Oswald's escort of three to six detectives and policemen
had to push their way through the newsmen who sought to surround them. (See
Commission Exhibit No. 2631, p. 205.) Although the Dallas press normally did not
take pictures of a prisoner without first obtaining permission of the police,
who generally asked the prisoner, this practice was not followed by any of the
newsmen with Oswald. Generally when Oswald appeared the newsmen turned their
cameras on him, thrust microphones at his face, and shouted questions at him.
Sometimes he answered. Reporters in the forefront of the throng would repeat his
answers for the benefit of those behind them who could not hear. On Saturday,
however in response to police admonitions, the reporters exercised more
restraint and shouted fewer questions at Oswald when he passed through the
corridor.
Oswald's most prolonged exposure occurred at the midnight press conference on
Friday night. In response to demands of newsmen, District Attorney Wade, after
consulting with Chief Curry and Captain Fritz, had announced shortly before
midnight that Oswald would appear at a press conference in the basement assembly
room. An estimated 70 to 100 people, including Jack Ruby, and other unauthorized
persons, crowded into the small downstairs room. No identification was required.
The room was so packed that Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson and Captain Fritz who
came down to the basement after the crowd had assembled could not get in and
were forced to remain in the doorway.
Oswald was brought into the room shortly after midnight. Curry had instructed
policemen not to permit newsmen to touch Oswald or get close to him, but no
steps were taken to shield Oswald from the crowd. Captain Fritz had asked that
Oswald be placed on the platform used for lineups so that he could be more
easily removed "if anything happened."Chief Curry, however, insisted that Oswald
stand on the floor in front of the stage, where he was also in front of the
one-way nylon-cloth screen customarily used to prevent a suspect. from seeing
those present in the room. This was done because cameramen had told Curry that
their cameras would not photograph well through the screen.
Curry had instructed the reporters that they were not to "ask any questions
and try to interview ... [Oswald] in any way, " but when he was brought into the
room, immediately they began to shoot questions at him and shove microphones
into his face." It was difficult to hear Oswald's answers above the uproar.
Cameramen stood on the tables to take pictures and others pushed forward to get
close-ups. (See Commission Exhibit No. 2965, p. 207.) The noise and confusion
mounted as reporters shouted at each other to get out of the way and cameramen
made frantic efforts to get into position for pictures. After Oswald had been in
the room only a few minutes, Chief Curry intervened and directed that Oswald be
taken back to the jail because, he testified, the newsmen "tried to overrun
him."
The decision to move Oswald to the county jail on Sunday morning was reached
by Chief Curry the preceding evening. Sometime after 7:30 Saturday evening,
according to Assistant Chief Batchelor, two reporters told him that they wanted
to go out to dinner but that "they didn't want to miss anything if we were going
to move the prisoner." Curry came upon them at that point and told the two
newsmen that if they returned by 10 o'clock in the morning, they wouldn't "miss
anything." A little later, after checking with Captain Fritz, Curry made a
similar announcement to the assembled reporters. Curry reported the making of
his decision to move Oswald as follows:
Then, I talked to Fritz about when he thought he would transfer the
prisoner, and he didn't think it was a good idea to transfer him at night
because of the fact you couldn't see, and if anybody tried to cause them any
trouble, they needed to see who they were and where it was coming from and so
forth, and he suggested that we wait until daylight, so this was normal
procedure, I mean, for Fritz to determine when he is going to transfer his
prisoners, so I told him "Okay." I asked him, I said, "What time do you think
you will be ready tomorrow?" And he didn't know exactly and I said, "Do you
think about 10 o'clock, " and he said, "I believe so, " and then is when I went
out and told the newspaper people..."I believe if you are back here by 10
o'clock you will be back in time to observe anything you care to observe."
During the night, between 2:30 and 3 a.m., the local office of the FBI
and the sheriff's office received telephone calls from an unidentified man who
warned that a committee had decided "to kill the man that killed the President."
Shortly after, an FBI agent notified the Dallas police of the anonymous threat.
The police department and ultimately Chief Curry were informed of both
threats. Curry decided that Oswald would leave the building via the basement. He
stated later that he reached this decision shortly after his arrival at the
police building Sunday morning, when members of the press had already begun to
gather in the basement. There is no evidence that anyone opposed this decision.
Two members of the Dallas police did suggest to Captain Fritz that Oswald be
taken from the building by another exit, leaving the press "waiting in the
basement and on Commerce Street, and we could be to the county jail before
anyone knew what was taking place." However, Fritz said that he did not think
Curry would agree to such a plan because he had promised that Oswald would be
transferred at a time when newsmen could take pictures. Forrest Sorrels also
suggested to Fritz that Oswald be moved at an unannounced time when no one was
around, but Fritz again responded that Curry "wanted to go along with the press
and not try to put anything over on them." Preliminary arrangements to obtain
additional personnel to assist with the transfer were begun Saturday evening. On
Saturday night, the police reserves were requested to provide 8 to 10 men on
Sunday, and additional reservists were sought in the morning. Capt. C. E.
Talbert, who was in charge of the patrol division for the city of Dallas on the
morning of November 24, retained a small number of policemen in the building
when he took charge that morning and later ordered other patrolmen from several
districts to report to the basement. At about 9 a.m. Deputy Chief Stevenson
instructed all detectives within the building to remain for the transfer.
Sheriff Decker testified that his men were ready to receive Oswald at the county
jail from the early hours of Sunday morning.
With the patrolmen and reserve policemen available to him, Captain Talbert,
on his own initiative, undertook to secure the basement of the police department
building. He placed policemen outside the building at the top of the Commerce
Street ramp to keep all spectators on the opposite side of Commerce Street.
Later, Talbert directed that patrolmen be assigned to all street intersections
the transfer vehicle would cross along the route to the county jail. His most
significant security precautions, however, were steps designed to exclude
unauthorized persons from the basement area. The spacious basement of the Police
and Courts Building contains, among other things, the jail office and the police
garage. (See Commission Exhibit No. 2179, p. 211.) The jail office, into which
the jail elevator opens, is situated on the west side of an auto ramp cutting
across the length of the basement from Main Street, on the north side of the
building, to Commerce Street, on the south side. From the foot of this ramp, on
the east side, midway through the basement, a decline runs down a short distance
to the l-shaped police garage. In addition to the auto ramp, five doors to the
garage provide access to the basement from the Police and Courts Building on the
west side of the garage and the attached Municipal Building on the east. Three
of these five doors provide access to three elevators opening into the garage,
two for passengers near the central part of the garage and one for service at
the east end of the garage. A fourth door near the passenger elevator opens into
the municipal building; the fifth door, at the Commerce Street side of the
garage, opens into a sub-basement that is connected with both buildings.
Shortly after 9 o'clock Sunday morning, policemen cleared the basement of all
but police personnel. Guards were stationed at the top of the Main and Commerce
Streets auto ramps leading down into the basement, at each of the five doorways
into the garage, and at the double doors leading to the public hallway adjacent
to the jail office. Then, Sgt. Patrick T. Dean, acting under instructions from
Talbert, directed 14 men in a search of the garage. Maintenance workers were
directed to leave the area. The searchers examined the rafters, tops of air
conditioning ducts, and every closet and room opening off the garage. They
searched the interior and trunk compartment of automobiles parked in the garage.
The two passenger elevators in the central part of the garage were not in
service and the doors were shut and locked; the service elevator was moved to
the first floor, and the operator was instructed not to return it to the
basement.
Despite the thoroughness with which the search was conducted, there still
existed one and perhaps two weak points in controlling access to the garage.
Testimony did not resolve positively whether or not the stairway door near the
public elevators was locked both from the inside and outside as was necessary to
secure it effectively. And although guards were stationed near the double doors,
the hallway near the jail office was accessible to people from inside the Police
and Courts Building without the necessity of presenting identification. Until
seconds before Oswald was shot, newsmen hurrying to photograph Oswald were able
to run without challenge through those doors into the basement.
After the search had been completed, the police allowed news representatives
to reenter the basement area and gather along the entrance to the garage on the
east side of the ramp. Later, the police permitted the newsmen to stand in front
of the railing on the east side of the ramp leading to Main Street. The
policemen deployed by Talbert and Dean had instructions to allow no one but
identified news media representatives into the basement. As before, the police
accepted any credentials that appeared authentic, though some officers did make
special efforts to check for pictures and other forms of corroborating
identification. Many newsmen reported that they were checked on more than one
occasion while they waited in the basement. A small number did not recall that
their credentials were ever checked.
Shortly after his arrival on Sunday morning, Chief Curry issued instructions
to keep reporters and cameramen out of the jail office and to keep television
equipment behind the railing separating the basement auto ramp from the
garage. At about 11 a.m., Deputy Chief Stevenson requested that Capt. O. A. Jones of
the forgery bureau bring all available detectives from the third floor offices
to the basement. Jones instructed the detectives who accompanied him to the
basement to line the walls on either side of the passageway cleared for the
transfer party. According to Detective T. D. McMillon,
...Captain Jones explained to us that, when they brought the prisoner
out, that he wanted two lines formed and we were to keep these two lines formed:
you know, a barrier on either side of them, kind of an aisle ... for them to
walk through, and when they came down this aisle, we were to keep this line
intact and move along with them until the man was placed in the car.
With Assistant Chief Batchelor's permission, Jones removed photographers
who had gathered once again in the basement jail office. Jones recalled that he
instructed all newsmen along the Main Street ramp to remain behind an imaginary
line extending from the southeast corner of the jail office to the railing on
the east side of the ramp; other officers recalled that Jones directed the
newsmen to move away from the foot of the Main Street ramp and to line up
against the east railing. In any event, newsmen were allowed to congregate along
the foot of the ramp after Batchelor observed that there was insufficient room
along the east of the ramp to permit all the news representatives to see Oswald
as he was brought out. By the time Oswald reached the basement, 40 to 50 newsmen
and 70 to 75 police officers were assembled there.
Three television cameras stood along the railing and most of the newsmen were
congregated in that area and at the top of the adjacent decline leading into the
garage. A group of newsmen and police officers, best estimated at about 20,
stood strung across the bottom of the Main Street ramp. Along the south wall of
the passageway outside the jail office door were about eight detectives, and
three detectives lined the north wall. Two officers stood in front of the double
doors leading into the passageway from the corridor next to the jail office.
(See Commission Exhibit No. 2634, p. 214.) Beginning Saturday night, the public
had been kept informed of the approximate time of the transfer. At approximately
10:20 a.m. Curry told a press conference that Oswald would be moved in an
armored truck and gave a general description of other security precautions.
Apparently no newsmen were informed of the transfer route, however, and the
route was not disclosed to the driver of the armored truck until the truck
arrived at the Commerce Street exit at about 11:07 a.m. When they learned of its
arrival, many of the remaining newsmen who had waited on the third floor
descended to the basement. Shortly after, newsmen may have had another
indication that the transfer was imminent if they caught a glimpse through the
glass windows of Oswald putting on a sweater in Captain Fritz' office.
Because the driver feared that the truck might stall if it had to start from
the bottom of the ramp and because the overhead clearance appeared to be
inadequate, Assistant Chief Batchelor had it backed only into the entranceway at
the top of the ramp. Batchelor and others then inspected the inside of the
truck. Curry agreed to Fritz' plan; the armored truck would be used as a decoy. They
decided that the armored truck would leave the ramp first, followed by a car
which would contain only security officers. A police car bearing Oswald would
follow. After proceeding one block, the car with Oswald would turn off and
proceed directly to the county jail; the armored truck would follow a lead car
to the jail along the previously agreed upon and more circuitous
route. On arriving in the basement, Pierce asked Sgt. James A. Putnam and Billy Joe
Maxey to accompany him in the lead car. Since the armored truck was blocking the
Commerce Street ramp, it would be necessary to drive out the Main Street ramp
and circle the block to Commerce Street. Maxey sat on the back seat of Pierce's
car, and Putnam helped clear a path through reporters on the ramp so that Pierce
could drive up toward Main Street. When the car passed by the reporters at about
11:20 a.m., Putnam entered the car on the right front side. Pierce drove to the
top of the Main Street ramp and slowed momentarily as Patrolman Roy E. Vaughn
stepped from his position at the top of the ramp toward the street to watch for
traffic. After Pierce's car left the garage area, Brown drove another police car
out of the garage, moved part way up the Commerce Street ramp, and began to back
down into position to receive Oswald. Dhority also proceeded to drive the
follow-up car into position ahead of Brown.
As Pierce's car started up the ramp at about 11:20 a.m., Oswald, accompanied
by Captain Fritz and four detectives, arrived at the jail office. Cameramen in
the hallway of the basement took pictures of Oswald through the interior glass
windows of the jail office as he was led through the office to the exit. Some of
these cameramen then ran through the double doors near the jail office and
squeezed into the line which had formed across the Main Street ramp. Almost the whole line of people pushed forward when Oswald started to
leave the jail office, the door, the hallall the newsmen were poking their sound
mikes across to him and asking questions, and they were everyone sticking their
flashbulbs up and around and over him and in his face.
After Oswald had moved about 10 feet from the door of the jail office,
Jack Ruby passed between a newsman and a detective at the edge of the straining
crowd on the Main Street ramp. With his right hand extended and holding a
caliber revolver, Ruby stepped quickly forward and fired a single fatal bullet
into Oswald's abdomen. (See Commission Exhibit No. 2636, p. 218.)
The Commission has been able to establish with precision the time of certain
events leading up to the shooting. Minutes before Oswald appeared in the
basement, Ruby was in the Western Union office located on the same block of Main
Street some 350 feet from the top of the Main Street ramp. The time stamp on a
money order which he sent and on the receipt found in his pocket establish that
the order was accepted for transmission at almost exactly 11:17 a.m. Ruby was
then observed to depart the office walking in the direction of the police
building. Video tapes taken without interruption before the shooting establish
that Lieutenant Pierce's car cleared the crowd at the foot of the ramp 55
seconds before the shooting. They also show Ruby standing at the foot of the
ramp on the Main Street side before the shooting. (See Commission Exhibit No.
2635, p. 220.)
The shooting occurred very close to 11:21 a.m. This time has been established
by observing the time on a clock appearing in motion pictures of Oswald in the
basement jail office, and by records giving the time of Oswald's departure from
the city jail and the time at which an ambulance was summoned for Oswald. The testimony of two witnesses partially corroborates Ruby's claim that he
entered by the Main Street ramp. James Turner, an employee of WBAP-TV Fort
Worth, testified that while he was standing near the railing on the east side of
the Main Street ramp, perhaps 30 seconds before the shooting, he observed a man
he is confident was Jack Ruby moving slowly down the Main Street ramp about 10
feet from the bottom. Two other witnesses testified that they thought they had
seen Ruby on the Main Street side of the ramp before the shooting.
One other witness has testified regarding the purported movements of a man on
the Main Street ramp, but his testimony merits little credence. A former police
officer, N.J. Daniels, who was standing at the top of the ramp with the single
patrolman guarding this entrance, R. E. Vaughn, testified that "3 or 4 minutes,
I guess" before the shooting, a man walked down the Main Street ramp in full
view of Vaughn but was not stopped or questioned by the officer. Daniels did not
identify the man as Ruby. Moreover, he gave a description which differed in
important respects from Ruby's appearance on November 24, and he has testified
that he doesn't think the man was Ruby. On November 24, Vaughn telephoned
Daniels to ask him if he had seen anybody walk past him on the morning of the
24th and was told that he had not; it was not until November 29 that Daniels
came forward with the statement that he had seen a man enter.
Although the sum of this evidence tends to support Ruby's claim that he
entered by the Main Street ramp, there is other evidence not fully consistent
with Ruby's story. Patrolman Vaughn stated that he checked the credentials of
all unknown persons seeking' to enter the basement, and his testimony was
supported by several persons. Vaughn denied that the emergence of Lieutenant
Pierce's car from the building distracted him long enough to allow Ruby to enter
the ramp unnoticed, and neither he nor any of the three officers in Lieutenant
Pierce's car saw Ruby enter.
Despite Vaughn's denial the Commission has found no credible evidence to
support. any other entry route. Two Dallas detectives believed they observed
three men pushing a WBAP-TV camera into the basement minutes before the
shooting', while only two were with the camera after Oswald had been shot.
However, films taken in the basement show the WBAP-TV camera being pushed past
the detectives by only two men. The suspicion of the detectives is probably
explained by testimony that a third WBAP-TV employee ran to help steady the
incoming camera as it entered the basement, probably just before the camera
became visible on the films. Moreover, since the camera entered the basement
close to 4 minutes before the shooting, it is virtually impossible that Ruby
could have been in the basement at that time. The possibility that Ruby entered
the basement by some other route has been investigated, but the Commission has
found no evidence to support it. Ruby could have walked from the Western Union
office to the Commerce Street ramp on the other side of the building in about 2
and a half minutes. However, during the minutes preceding the shooting video
tapes show the armored truck in the entranceway to this ramp with only narrow
clearance on either side. (See Commission Exhibit. No. 2710, p. 223.) Several
policemen were standing near the truck and a large crowd of spectators was
gathered across the street. It is improbable that Ruby could have squeezed past
the truck without having been observed. If Ruby entered by any other means, he
would have had to pass first through the Police and Courts Building or the
attached Municipal Building, and then secondly through one of the five doors
into the basement, all of which, according to the testimony of police officers,
were secured. The testimony was not completely positive about one of the doors.
There is no evidence to support the speculations that Ruby used a press badge
to gain entry to the basement or that he concealed himself in a police car.
Police found no form of press card on Ruby's person after his apprehension, nor
any discarded badges within the basement. There is no evidence that any police
officer admitted Ruby on the pretense that he was a member of the press or any
other pretense. Ruby was known to have a wide acquaintance ship with Dallas policemen and to
seek their favor. According to testimony from many sources, he gave free coffee
at his clubs to many policemen while they were on duty and free admittance and
discounts on beverages when they were off duty. Although Chief Curry's estimate
that approximately 25 to 50 of the 1,175 men in the Dallas Police Department
knew Ruby may be too conservative, the Commission found no evidence of any
suspicious relationships between Ruby and any police officer. The Commission
found no substantial evidence that any member of the Dallas Police Department
recognized Jack Ruby as an unauthorized person in the basement prior to the time
Sgt. P. T. Dean, according to his testimony, saw Ruby dart forward toward
Oswald. But Dean was then part way up the Commerce Street ramp, too far removed
to act.
Patrolman W. J. Harrison, Capt. Glen King, and reserve officers Capt. C. O.
Arnett and Patrolman W. M. Croy were among those in front of Ruby at the time
Dean saw him. They all faced away from Ruby, toward the jail office. Video tapes
show that Harrison turned in the direction of the ramp at the time Lieutenant
Pierce's car passed, and once again 25 seconds later, but there is no indication
that he observed or recognized Ruby. The policemen standing on the south side of
the passageway from the jail office, who might have been looking in Ruby's
direction, had the glare of television and photographer's lights in their eyes.
The Commission also considered the possibility that a member of the police
department called Ruby at his apartment and informed him, either intentionally
or unintentionally, of the time of the planned transfer. From at least 10:19
a.m., until close to 11 a.m., on Sunday, Ruby was at his apartment, where he
could have received a call that the transfer was imminent. He apparently left
his apartment between 10:45 and 11 a.m. However, the drive from Ruby's apartment
to the Western Union office takes approximately 15 minutes. Since the time of
the contemplated transfer could not have been known to anyone until a few
minutes before 11:15 a.m., a precise time could not have been conveyed to Ruby
while he was at his apartment. Moreover, the television and radio publicized the
transfer plans throughout the morning, obviating the need for Ruby to obtain
information surreptitiously.
Unfortunately these did not include adequate control of the great crowd of
newsmen that inundated the police department building. The Dallas police had in
custody a man whose alleged act had brought upon him immediate and universal
opprobrium. Although the presence of a great mass of press representatives created an
extraordinary security problem in the building, the police department pursued
its normal policy of admitting the press. That policy, set forth in General
Order No. 81 of the Dallas Police Department, provided
...that members of this Department render every assistance, except such
as obviously may seriously hinder or delay the proper functioning of the
Department, to the accredited members of the official news-gathering agencies
and this includes newspaper, television cameramen and news-reel photographers.
In a letter to all members of the police department, dated February 7,
1963, Chief Curry explained the general order, in part, as follows:
The General Order covering this subject is not merely permissive. It does
not state that the Officer may, if he so chooses, assist the press. It rather
places on him a responsibility to lend active assistance. Aside from numbers, the gathering of reporters presented a problem because
most of them were representatives of the national and foreign press, rather than
the local press. These newsmen carried individual press cards rather than
identification cards issued by the Dallas police. Therefore, it was impossible
for the police to verify quickly the identity of this great number of unfamiliar
people who appeared almost simultaneously. Because of the close physical
proximity of the milling mass of insistent newsmen to the prisoner, the failure
to authenticate press credentials subjected the prisoner to a serious security
risk. Although steps were taken on Friday afternoon to insure that persons
seeking entry to the third floor were there for a legitimate purpose, reasons
could be fabricated. Moreover, because of the large crowd, it was easier for
unauthorized persons to slip by those guarding the entrances. Jack Ruby, for
one, was able to gain entry to the third-floor corridor on Friday night. The
third-floor corridor provided the only passageway between the homicide and
robbery bureau and the jail elevator.
No thought seems to have been given, however, to the possibility of
questioning Oswald on some other floor. Moreover, Oswald's most extended
exposure to the press, at the Friday evening press conference, was unrelated to
any phase of the investigation and was motivated primarily by the desire to
satisfy the demands of the news media to see the prisoner. The risks attendant
upon this appearance were emphasized by the presence of unauthorized persons,
including Jack Ruby, at the press conference in the basement assembly room.
Although Oswald was repeatedly exposed to possible assaults on Friday and
Saturday, he met his death on Sunday, when police took the most extensive
security precautions. The assembly of more than 70 police officers, some of them
armed with tear gas, and the contemplated use of an armored truck, appear to
have been designed primarily to repel an attempt of a mob to seize the prisoner.
Chief Curry's own testimony indicated that such a focus resulted not from any
appraisal of the varied risks to Oswald's life but came about in response to the
telephone threat Sunday morning that a hundred men were going to. attack Oswald.
A more balanced appraisal would have given thought to protection against any
attack. For example, the acceptance of inadequate press credentials posed a
clear avenue for a one-man assault. The likelihood of an unauthorized person
obtaining entry by such means is confirmed not alone by the fact that Jack Ruby
managed to get by a guard at one entrance. Several newsmen related that their
credentials were not checked as they entered the basement Sunday morning.
Seconds before Oswald was shot, the double doors from the hallway next to the
jail office afforded a means of entry to the basement without presentation of
credentials earlier demanded of newsmen.
The swarm of news people in the basement also substantially limited the
ability of the police to detect an unauthorized person once he had entered the
basement. 'While Jack Ruby might have been easily spotted if only police
officers had been in the basement, he remained apparently unnoticed in the crowd
of newsmen until he lunged forward toward Oswald. ...to remain in the hallways, ... to view the investigation and to keep
in constant touch with progress of the investigation. Moreover, the right of the public to know does not give the press license to
interfere with the efficient operation of law-enforcement agencies. Permitting
the press to remain on the third floor of the building served no valid purpose
that could not have been met if the press had been excluded from the third
floor, as it was from the fourth and fifth floors, and informed of developments
either through press releases or at press conferences elsewhere in the building.
Having failed to exclude the mass of the press from the basement during the
transfer of Oswald, the police department's security measures could not be
completely effective. Despite the pressures that prevailed, planning and
coordination of security arrangements could have been more thorough and precise.
No single member of the Dallas Police Department ever assumed full
responsibility for the details of Oswald's transfer. Chief Curry participated in
some of the planning, but he felt that primary authority for the transfer should
be Fritz', since Fritz had charge of the investigation.
According to Chief Curry
Fritz and I, I think, discussed this briefly, the possibility of getting
that prisoner out of the city hall during the night hours and by another route
and slipping him to the jail, but actually Fritz was not too much in favor of
this and I more or less left this up to Fritz as to when and how this transfer
would be made, because he has in the past transferred many of his prisoners to
the county jail and I felt that since it was his responsibility, the prisoner
was, to let him decide when and how he wanted to transfer this prisoner.
Fritz, on the other hand, felt that Curry was directing the transfer
arrangements: "I was transferring him like the chief told me to. transfer him."
When Capt. W. B. Frazier notified Fritz by telephone early Sunday morning about
the threats to Oswald's life, Fritz replied that Curry should be notified, since
he was handling the transfer. When urged to modify the transfer plans to avoid
the press, as he later testified he would have preferred to do, Fritz declined
on the ground that Curry had already decided to the contrary. Hence, if the
recollection of both officials is accurate, the basic decision to move Oswald at
an announced time and in the presence of the news media was never carefully
thought through by either man. Curry and Fritz had agreed Saturday evening that
Oswald should not be moved at night, but their discussion apparently went little
further.
Perhaps the members of the Dallas Police Department were, as many testified,
accustomed to working together so that formal instructions were sometimes
unnecessary. On the other hand, it is clear, at least in retrospect, that this
particular occasion demanded more than the usual informal unspoken
understandings. The evidence indicates that no member of the department at any
time considered fully the implications of moving Oswald through the basement.
Nor did any single official or group of officials coordinate and direct where
the transfer vehicle would be stationed to accept Oswald, where the press would
stand, and the number and positioning of police officers in the basement.
Captain Jones indicated that there were to be two solid lines of policemen from
the jail office door to the transfer vehicle, but lines were formed only along
the walls of the areaway between the jail office door and the ramp. The newsmen
were not kept east of the auto ramp where a railing would have separated them
from Oswald. No strong ranks of policemen were ever placed in front of the
newsmen once they were allowed to gather in the area of the Main Street ramp.
Many policemen in the basement did not know the function they were supposed to
perform. No instructions were given that certain policemen should watch the
crowd rather than Oswald. Apparently no one gave any thought to the blinding
effect of television and other camera lights upon the escort party. Largely on
his own initiative, Captain Talbert undertook to secure the basement, with only
minimal coordination with those responsible for and familiar with the route
Oswald would take through the basement. Several officials recalled that Lt.
Woodrow Wiggins was directed to clear the basement jail office, but Wiggins
testified that he received no such assignment. In any event, less than 20
minutes before the transfer, Captain Jones observed newsmen in the jail office
and had them removed. But no official removed news personnel from the corridor
beside the jail office; indeed, cameramen took pictures through the glass
windows of the jail office as Oswald walked through it toward the basement, and
then approached to within 20 feet of Oswald from the rear at the same time that
Jack Ruby moved toward Oswald from the front.
A clear example of the inadequacy of coordination was the last-minute change
in plans to transfer Oswald in an unmarked police car rather than by armored
truck. The plan to use an armored vehicle was adopted without informing Fritz.
When Fritz was told of the arrangement shortly after 11 o'clock, he objected,
and hurried steps were taken to modify the arrangements. Fritz was then
prematurely informed that the basement arrangements were complete. When Oswald
and the escorting detectives entered the basement, the transfer car had not yet
been backed into position, nor had the policemen been arranged to block the
newsmen's access to Oswald's path. If the transfer car had been carefully
positioned between the press and Oswald, Ruby might have been kept several yards
from his victim and possibly without a clear view of him.
Detective Leavelle, who accompanied Oswald into the basement, testified:
...I was surprised when I walked to the door and the car was not in the
spot it should have been, but I could see it was in back, and backing into
position, but had it been in position where we were told it would be, that would
have eliminated a lot of the area in which anyone would have access to him,
because it would have been blocked. by the car. In fact, if the car had been
sitting where we were told it was going to be, see it would have been sitting
directly upon the spot where Ruby was standing when he fired the shot.
Captain Jones described the confusion with which Oswald's entry into the
basement was in fact received:
Then the changegoing to put two cars up there. There is no reason why
that back car can't get all the way back to the jail office. The original plan
would be that the line of officers would be from the jail door to the vehicle.
Then they say, "Here he comes." ...It is too late to get the people out of the
way of the car and form the line. I am aware that. Oswald is already coming
because of the furor, so, I was trying to keep everybody out of the way and keep
the way clear and I heard a shot.
Therefore, regardless of whether the press should have been allowed to
witness the transfer, security measures in the basement for Oswald's protection
could and should have been better organized and more thorough. These additional
deficiencies were directly related to the decision to admit newsmen to the
basement. The Commission concludes that the failure of the police to remove
Oswald secretly or to control the crowd in the basement at the time of the
transfer were the major causes of the security breakdown which led to Oswald's
death.
Q. Chief Curry, I understand you have some new information in this case.
Could you relate what that is? Many other members of the police department, including high officials,
detectives, and patrolmen, were also interviewed by news representatives during
these days. Some of these men had participated in specific aspects of the ease,
such as the capture of Oswald at the Texas Theatre and the search for evidence
at the Texas School Book Depository Building. Few, if any, seemed reluctant to
submit to questions and to being televised. It seemed to District Attorney Wade
that the newsmen "just followed everybody everywhere they went ... they
interviewed some of your patrolmen ... on the corner ... they were interviewing
anybody."Wade himself also made several statements to the press. He visited
police headquarters twice on Friday, twice on Saturday, and twice on Sunday. On
most of these occasions he was interviewed by the press and appeared on
television. After Oswald had appeared before the press on Friday night, Wade
held an impromptu conference with reporters in the overflowing assembly room.
Wade told the press on Saturday that he would not reveal any evidence because it
might prejudice the selection of a jury. On other occasions, however, he
mentioned some items of evidence and expressed his opinions regarding Oswald's
guilt. He told the press on Friday night that Oswald's wife had told the police
that her husband had a rifle in the garage at the house in Irving and that it
was missing the morning of the assassination. On one occasion he repeated the
error that the murder rifle had been a Mauser. Another time, he stated his
belief that Oswald had prepared for the assassination months in advance,
including what he would tell the police. He also said that Oswald had practiced
with the rifle to improve his marksmanship.
The running commentary on the investigation by the police inevitably carried
with it the disclosure of many details that proved to be erroneous. In their
efforts to keep the public abreast of the investigation, the police reported
hearsay items and unverified leads; further investigation proved many of these
to be incorrect or inaccurate. For example, the rifle found on the sixth floor
of the Texas School Book Depository Building was initially identified as a
Mauser 7.65 rather than a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5 because a deputy constable who
was one of the first to see it thought it looked like a Mauser. He neither
handled the weapon nor saw it at close range.
Police sources were also responsible for the mistaken notion that the chicken
bones found on the sixth floor were the remains of Oswald's lunch. They had in
fact been left by another employee who ate his lunch there at least 15 minutes
before the assassination. Curry repeated the erroneous report that a Negro had
picked up Oswald near the scene of the assassination and driven him across town.
It was also reported that the map found in Oswald's room contained a marked
route of the Presidential motorcade when it actually contained markings of
places where Oswald may have applied for jobs, including, of course, the Texas
School Book Depository.
Concern about the effects of the unlimited disclosures was being voiced by
Saturday morning. According to District Attorney Wade, he received calls from
lawyers in Dallas and elsewhere expressing concern about providing an attorney
for Oswald and about the amount of information being given to the press by the
police and the district attorney. Curry continued to answer questions on
television and radio during the remainder of the day and Sunday morning. The shooting of Oswald shocked the Dallas police, and after the interviews
that immediately followed the shooting they were disposed to remain silent.
Chief Curry made only one more television appearance after the shooting. At 1:30
p.m., he descended to the assembly room where, tersely and grimly, he announced
Oswald's death. He refused to answer any of the questions shouted at him by the
persistent reporters, concluding the conference in less than a
minute. Wade nonetheless proceeded to hold a lengthy formal press conference that
evening, in which he attempted to list all of the evidence that had been
accumulated at that point tending to establish Oswald as the assassin of
President Kennedy. Wade was innocent of one error imputed to him since November 24. The
published transcript of part of the press conference furnished to newspapers by
the Associated Press represented Wade as having identified the cabdriver who
took Oswald to North Beckley Avenue after the shooting, as one named "Darryl
Click." The transcript as it appeared in the New York Times and the Washington
Post of November 26, reads:
A. [Wade] a lady. He then the bus, he asked the bus driver to stop, got
off at a stop, caught a taxicab driver, Darryl Click. don't have his exact
placeand went to his home in Oak Cliff, changed his clothes hurriedly, and left.
The correct transcript of the press conference, taken from an audio tape
supplied by station WBAP, Fort. Worth, is as follows:
A. [Wade] A lady. He then the bus, he asked the bus driver to stop, got
off at a stop, caught a taxicab driver. While Molina was being questioned, officials of the police department made
statements or answered questions that provided the basis for television reports
about Molina during the day. These reports spoke of a "second suspect being
picked up, " insinuated that the Dallas police had reason to suspect another
person who worked in the Texas School Book Depository, stated that the suspect
had been arrested and his home searched, and mentioned that Molina may have been
identified by the U.S. Department of Justice as a possible subversive.
No evidence was ever presented to link Molina with Oswald except as a fellow
employee of the Texas School Book Depository. According to Molina, he had never
spoken to Oswald. The FBI notified the Commission that Molina had never been the
subject. of an investigation by it and that it had never given any information
about Molina to the Dallas police concerning any alleged subversive activities
by him. The Dallas police explained in a statement to the FBI that they had
never had a file on Molina, but that they did have one on the American G.I.
Forum.
Molina lost his job in December. He felt that he was being discharged because
of the unfavorable publicity he had received, but officials of the Depository
claimed that automation was the reason. Molina testified that he had difficulty
in finding another position, until finally, with the help of a fellow church
member, he secured a position at. a lower salary than his previous one. For example, though expressly recognizing that Oswald's wife could not be
compelled to testify against him, District Attorney Wade revealed to the Nation
that Marina Oswald had affirmed her husband's ownership of a rifle like that
found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. Curry stated that
Oswald had refused to take a lie detector test, although such a statement would
have been inadmissible in a trial. The exclusion of such evidence, however,
would have been meaningless if jurors were already familiar with the same facts
from previous television or newspaper reports. Wade might have influenced
prospective jurors by his mistaken statement that the paraffin test showed that
Oswald had fired a gun. The tests merely showed that he had nitrate traces on
his hands, which did not necessarily mean that he had fired either a rifle or a
pistol.
The disclosure of evidence was seriously aggravated by the statements of
numerous responsible officials that they were certain of Oswald's guilt. Captain
Fritz said that the case against Oswald was "cinched." Curry reported on
Saturday that "we are sure of our case." Curry announced that he considered
Oswald sane, and Wade told the public that he would ask for the death penalty.
The American Bar Association declared in December 1963 that "widespread
publicizing of Oswald's alleged guilt, involving statements by officials and
public disclosures of the details of 'evidence, ' would have made it extremely
difficult to impanel an unprejudiced' jury and afford the accused a fair trial."
Local bar associations expressed similar feelings. The Commission agrees that
Lee Harvey Oswald's opportunity for a trial by 12 jurors free of preconception
as to his guilt or innocence would have been seriously jeopardized by the
premature disclosure and weighing of the evidence against him. The problem of
disclosure of information and its effect on trials is, of course, further
complicated by the independent activities of the press in developing information
on its own from sources other than law enforcement agencies. Had the police not
released the specific items of evidence against Oswald, it is still possible
that the other information presented on television and in the newspapers,
chiefly of a biographical nature, would itself have had a prejudicial effect on
the public. In explanation of the news policy adopted by the Dallas authorities,
Chief Curry observed that "it seemed like there was a great demand by the
general public to know what was going on." In a prepared statement, Captain King
wrote:
At that time we felt a necessity for permitting the newsmen as much
latitude as possible. We realized the magnitude of the incident the newsmen were
there to cover. We realized that not only the nation but the world would be
greatly interested in what occurred in Dallas. We believed that we had an
obligation to make as widely known as possible everything we could regarding the
investigation of the assassination and the manner in which we undertook that
investigation.
The Commission recognizes that the people of the United States, and
indeed the world, had a deep-felt interest in learning of the events surrounding
the death of President Kennedy, including the development of the investigation
in Dallas. An informed public provided the ultimate guarantee that adequate
steps would be taken to apprehend those responsible for the assassination and
that all necessary precautions would be taken to protect the national security.
It was therefore proper and desirable that the public know which agencies were
participating in the investigation and the rate at which their work was
progressing. The public was also entitled to know that Lee Harvey Oswald had
been apprehended and that the State had gathered sufficient evidence to arraign
him for the murders of the President and Patrolman Tippit, that he was being
held pending action of the grand jury, that the investigation was continuing,
and that the law enforcement agencies had discovered no evidence which tended to
show that any other person was involved in either slaying. However, neither the
press nor the public had a right to be contemporaneously informed by the police
or prosecuting authorities of the details of the evidence being accumulated
against Oswald. Undoubtedly the public was interested in these disclosures, but
its curiosity should not have been satisfied at the expense of the accused's
right to a trial by an impartial jury. The courtroom, not the newspaper or
television screen, is the appropriate forum in our system for the trial of a man
accused of a crime. If the evidence in the possession of the authorities had not
been disclosed, it is true that the public would not have been in a position to
assess the adequacy of the investigation or to apply pressures for further
official undertakings. But a major consequence of the hasty and at times
inaccurate divulgence of evidence after the assassination was simply to give
rise to groundless rumors and public confusion. Moreover, without learning the
details of the case, the public could have been informed by the responsible
authority of the general scope of the investigation and the extent to which
State and Federal agencies were assisting in the police work.
Moreover, by constantly pursuing public officials, the news representatives
placed an insistent pressure. upon them to disclose information. And this
pressure was not without effect, since the police attitude toward the press was
affected by the desire to maintain satisfactory relations with the news
representatives and to create a favorable image of themselves. Chief Curry
frankly told the Commission that
I didn't order them out of the building, which if I had it to do over I
would. In the past like I say, we had always maintained very good relations with
our press, and they had always respected US...
Curry refused Fritz' request to put Oswald behind the screen in the
assembly room at the Friday night press conference because this might have
hindered the taking of pictures. Curry's subordinates had the impression that an
unannounced transfer of Oswald to the county jail was unacceptable because Curry
did not want to disappoint the newsmen; he had promised that they could witness
the transfer. It seemed clear enough that any attempt to exclude the press from
the building or to place limits on the information disclosed to them would have
been resented and disputed by the newsmen, who were constantly and aggressively
demanding all possible information about anything related to the assassination.
Although the Commission has found no corroboration in the video and audio tapes,
police officials recall that one or two representatives of the press reinforced
their demands to see Oswald by suggesting that the police had been guilty of
brutalizing him. They intimated that unless they were given the opportunity to
see him, these suggestions would be passed on to the public. Captain King
testified that he had been told that
A short time after Oswald's arrest one newsman held up a photograph and
said, "This is what the man charged with the assassination of the President
looks like. Or at least this is what he did look like. We don't know what he
looks like after an hour in the custody of the Dallas Police Department."
City Manager Elgin Crull stated that when he visited Chief Curry in his
office on the morning of November 23, Curry told him that he "felt it was
necessary to cooperate with the news media representatives, in order to avoid
being accused of using Gestapo tactics in connection with the handling of
Oswald." Crull agreed with Curry. The Commission deems any such veiled threats
to be absolutely without justification. The general disorder in the Police and
Courts Building during November 22-24 reveals a regrettable lack of self-
discipline by the newsmen. The Commission believes that the news media, as well
as the police authorities, who failed to impose conditions more in keeping with
the orderly process of justice, must share responsibility for the failure of law
enforcement which occurred in connection with the death of Oswald. On previous
occasions, public bodies have voiced the need for the exercise of self-restraint
by the news media in periods when the demand for information must be tempered by
other fundamental requirements of our society. At its annual meeting in
Washington in April 1964, the American Society of Newspaper Editors discussed
the role of the press in Dallas immediately after President Kennedy's
assassination. The discussion revealed the strong misgivings among the editors
themselves about the role that the press had played and their desire that the
press display more self-discipline and adhere to higher standards of conduct in
the future. To prevent a recurrence of the unfortunate events which followed the
assassination, however, more than general concern will be needed. The
promulgation of a code of professional conduct governing representatives of all
news media would be welcome evidence that the press had profiled by the lesson
of Dallas. The burden of insuring that appropriate action is taken to establish
ethical standards of conduct for the news media must also be borne, however, by
State and local governments, by the bar, and ultimately by the public. The
experience in Dallas during November 22-24 is a dramatic affirmation of the need
for steps to bring about a proper balance between the right of the public to be
kept informed and the right of the individual to a fair and impartial trial.
Interrogation Sessions
During the period between 2:30 p.m. on Friday
afternoon and 11:15 a.m. Sunday morning, Oswald was interrogated for a total of
approximately 12 hours. Though subject to intermittent questioning for more than
7 hours on Friday, Oswald was given 8 to 9 hours to rest that night. On Saturday
he was questioned for a total of only 3 hours during three interrogation
sessions, and on Sunday he was questioned for less than 2 hours. (These
interrogations are discussed in ch. IV.)
Oswald's Legal Rights
All available evidence indicates that Oswald was
not subjected to any physical hardship during the interrogation sessions or at
any other time while he was in custody. He was fed and allowed to rest. When he
protested on Friday against being handcuffed from behind, the cuffs were removed
and he was handcuffed in front. Although he made remarks to newsmen about
desiring a shower and demanding his "civil rights, " Oswald did not complain
about his treatment to any of the numerous police officers and other persons who
had much to do with him during the 2 days of his detention. As described in
chapter IV, Oswald received a slight cut over his right eye and a bruise under
his left eye during the scuffle in the Texas Theatre with the arresting
officers, three of whom were injured and required medical treatment. These marks
were visible to all who saw him during the 2 days of his detention and to
millions of television viewers.
Throughout the period of detention, however, Oswald was not
represented by counsel. At the Friday midnight press conference in the basement
assembly room, he made the following remarks:
A. No. I have not been charged with that.
In fact nobody has said that to me yet. The first thing I heard about it was
when the newspaper reporters in the hall asked me that question.
Q. Mr.
Oswald, how did you hurt your eye?
A. A policeman hit me.
On Friday evening,
representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union visited the police
department to determine whether Oswald was being deprived of counsel. They were
assured by police officials and Justice of the Peace Johnston that Oswald had
been informed of his rights and was being allowed to seek a lawyer. On Saturday
Oswald attempted several times to reach John Abt, a New York lawyer, by
telephone, but with no success. In the afternoon, he called Ruth Paine and asked
her to try to reach Abt for him, but she too failed. Later in the afternoon, H.
Louis Nichols, president of the Dallas Bar Association, visited Oswald in his
cell and asked him whether he wanted the association to obtain a lawyer for him.
Oswald declined the offer, stating a first preference for Abt and a second
preference for a lawyer from the American Civil Liberties Union. As late as
Sunday morning, according to Postal Inspector Harry D. Holmes, Oswald said that
he preferred to get his own lawyer.
Activity of Newsmen
Within an hour of Oswald's arrival at the police
department on November 22, it became known to newsmen that he was a possible
suspect in the slaying of President Kennedy as well as in the murder of
Patrolman Tippit. At least as early as 3:26 p.m. a television report carried
this information. Reporters and cameramen flooded into the building and
congregated in the corridor of the third floor, joining those few who had been
present when Oswald first arrived.
On the Third Floor
Felix McKnight, editor of the Dallas Times-Herald,
who handled press arrangements for the President's visit, estimated that within
24 hours of the assassination more than 800 representatives of news media were
in Dallas, including correspondents from foreign newspapers and press
associations. District Attorney Henry M. Wade thought that the crowd in the
third floor hallway itself may have numbered as many as 300. Most estimates,
including those based on examination of video tapes, place upwards of 100
newsmen and cameramen in the third floor corridor of the police department by
the evening of November 22. (See Commission Exhibit No. 2633, p. 203.) In the
words of an FBI agent who was present, the conditions at the police station were
"not too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, maybe like the Yankee
Stadium during the World Series games... In the lobby of the third floor,
television cameramen set up two large cameras and floodlights in strategic
positions that gave them a sweep of the corridor in either direction.
Technicians stretched their television cables into and out of offices, running
some of them out of the windows of a deputy chief's office and down the side of
the building. Men with newsreel cameras, still cameras, and microphones, more
mobile than the television cameramen, moved back and forth seeking information
and opportunities for interviews. Newsmen wandered into the offices of other
bureaus located on the third floor, sat on desks, and used police telephones;
indeed, one reporter admits hiding a telephone behind a desk so that he would
have exclusive access to it if something developed.
Such police efforts as
there were to control the newsmen were unavailing. Capt. Glen D. King,
administrative assistant to Chief Curry, witnessed efforts to clear an aisle
through the hallway, but related that "this was a constant battle because of the
number of newsmen who were there. They would move back into the aisle way that
had been cleared. They interfered with the movement of people who had to be
there." According to one detective, "they would be asked to stand back and stay
back but it wouldn't do much good, and they would push forward and you had to
hold them off physically." The detective recalled that on one occasion when he
was escorting a witness through the corridor he "stopped ... and looked down and
there was a joker had a camera stuck between ... [his] legs taking pictures... "
Forrest V. Sorrels of the Secret Service had the impression that the "press and
the television people just ... took over." Police control over the access of
other than newsmen to the third floor was of limited but increasing
effectiveness after Oswald's arrival at the police department. Initially no
steps. were taken to exclude unauthorized persons from the third floor corridor,
but late Friday afternoon Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor stationed guards at
the elevators and the stairway to prevent the admission of such persons. He also
directed the records room in the basement to issue passes, after verification by
the bureaus involved, to people who had legitimate business on the third floor.
Throughout the 3 days of Oswald's detention, the police were obliged to continue
normal business in all five bureaus located along the third floor hallway. Thus
many personsrelatives of prisoners, complainants, witnesses had occasion to
visit police offices on the third floor on business unrelated to the
investigation of the assassination. Newsmen seeking admission to the third floor
were required to identify themselves by their personal press cards; however, the
department did not follow its usual procedure of checking the authenticity of
press credentials. Captain King felt that this would have been impossible in
light of "the atmosphere that existed over there, the tremendous pressures that
existed, the fact that telephones were ringing constantly, that there were
droves of people in there ... the fact that the method by which you positively
identify someone ... it's not easy." Police officers on the third floor
testified that they carefully checked all persons for credentials, and most
newsmen indicated that after Batchelor imposed security they were required to
identify themselves by their press cards. Special Agent Sorrels of the Secret
Service stated that he was requested to present credentials on some of his
visits to the third floor. However, other newsmen apparently went unchallenged
during the entire period before Oswald was killed, although some of them were
wearing press badges on their lapels and some may have been known to the police
officers.
Oswald and the Press
When the police car bringing Oswald from the Texas
Theatre drove into the basement of police headquarters at about 2 p.m. on
Friday, some reporters and cameramen, principally from local papers and
stations, were already on hand. The policemen formed a wedge around Oswald and
conducted him to the elevator, but several newsmen crowded into the elevator
with Oswald and the police. When the elevator stopped at the third floor, the
cameramen ran ahead down the corridor, and then turned around and backed up,
taking pictures of Oswald as he was escorted toward the homicide and robbery
bureau office. According to one escorting officer, some six or seven reporters
followed the police into the bureau office so From Friday afternoon, when Oswald
arrived in the building, until Sunday, newspaper reporters and television
cameras focused their attention on the homicide office. In full view and within
arm's length of the assembled newsmen, Oswald traversed the 20 feet of corridor
between the homicide office and the locked door leading to the jail elevator at
least 15 times after his initial arrival. The jail elevator, sealed off from
public use, took him to his fifth floor cell and to the assembly room in the
basement for lineups and the Friday night news conference.
The Abortive Transfer
In Dallas, after a person is charged with a
felony, the county sheriff ordinarily takes custody of the prisoner and assumes
responsibility for his safekeeping. Normally, the Dallas Police Department
notifies the sheriff when a prisoner has been charged with a felony and the
sheriff dispatches his deputies to transport the accused to the county jail.
This is usually done within a few hours after the complaint has been filed. In
cases of unusual importance, however, the Dallas city police sometimes transport
the prisoners to the county jail.
Immediately after his arrival at the building on Sunday morning
between 8:30 and 8:45 a.m., Curry spoke by telephone with Sheriff J. E. Decker
about the transfer. When Decker indicated that he would leave to Curry the
decision on whether the sheriff's office or the police would move Oswald, Curry
decided that the police would handle it because "we had so much involved here,
we were the ones that were investigating the case and we had the officers set up
downstairs to handle it." After talking with Decker, Curry began to discuss
plans for the transfer. With the threats against Oswald in mind, Curry suggested
to Batchelor and Deputy Chief Stevenson that Oswald be transported to the county
jail in an armored truck, to which they agreed. While Batchelor made
arrangements to have an armored truck brought to the building, Curry and
Stevenson tentatively agreed on the route the armored truck would follow from
the building to the county jail.
Curry observed that in other respects Captain Talbert appeared to
have security measures in hand and allowed him to proceed on his own initiative.
Batchelor and Stevenson checked progress in the basement during the course of
the morning, and the officials were generally satisfied with the steps Talbert
had taken.
When Chief Curry learned that the truck had arrived, he informed
Captain Fritz that security controls were in effect and inquired how long the
questioning of Oswald would continue. At this point, Fritz learned for the first
time of the plan to convey Oswald by armored truck and immediately expressed his
disapproval. He urged the use of an unmarked police car driven by a police
officer, pointing out that this would be better from the standpoint of both
speed and maneuverability.
Captain Fritz instructed Detectives C. W. Brown and C. N. Dhority and
a third detective to proceed to the garage and move the follow up car and the
transfer car into place on the auto ramp. He told Lt. Rio S. Pierce to obtain
another automobile from the basement and take up a lead position on Commerce
Street. Deputy Chief Stevenson went back to the basement to inform Batchelor and
Jones of the change in plans. Oswald was given his sweater, and then his right
hand was handcuffed to the left hand of Detective J. R. Leavelle. Detective T.
L. Baker called the jail office to check on security precautions in the basement
and notify officials that the prisoner was being brought down.
Still
others remained just inside the double doors or proceeded through the double
doors after Oswald and his escort emerged from the jail office. (See Commission
Exhibit No. 2177, p. 217.) When Fritz came to the jail office door, he asked if
everything was ready, and a detective standing in the passageway answered yes.
Someone shouted, "Here he comes !"; additional spotlights were turned on in the
basement, and the din increased. A detective stepped from the jail office and
proceeded toward the transfer car. Seconds later Fritz and then Oswald, with
Detective Leavelle at his right, Detective L. C. Graves at his left, and
Detective L. D. Montgomery at his rear, came through the door. Fritz walked to
Brown's car, which had not yet backed fully into position; Oswald followed a few
feet behind. Newsmen near the double door moved forward after him. Though movie
films and video tapes indicate that the front line newsmen along the Main Street
ramp remained fairly stationary, it was the impression of many who were close to
the scene that with Oswald's appearance the crowd surged forward. According to
Detective Montgomery, who was walking directly behind Oswald, soon as we came
out this door ... this bunch here just moved in on us." To Detective B. H.
Combest, standing on the Commerce Street side of the passageway from the jail
office door, it appeared that
Possible Assistance to Jack Ruby in Entering the Basement
The killing of
Lee Harvey Oswald in the basement of police headquarters in the midst of more
than 70 police officers gave rise to immediate speculation that one or more
members of the police department provided Jack Ruby assistance which had enabled
him to enter the basement and approach within a few feet of the accused
Presidential assassin. In chapter VI, the Commission has considered whether
there is any evidence linking Jack Ruby with a conspiracy to kill the President.
At this point, however, it is appropriate to consider whether there is evidence
that Jack Ruby received assistance from Dallas policemen or others in gaining
access to the basement on the morning of November 24. An affirmative answer
would require that the evidence be evaluated for possible connection with the
assassination itself. While the Commission has found no evidence that Ruby
received assistance from any person in entering the basement, his means of entry
is significant in evaluating the adequacy of the precautions taken to protect
Oswald. Although more than a hundred policemen and newsmen were present in the
basement of police headquarters during the 10 minutes before the shooting of
Oswald, none has been found who definitely observed Jack Ruby's entry into the
basement. After considering all the evidence, the Commission has concluded that
Ruby entered the basement unaided, probably via the Main Street ramp, and no
more than 3 minutes before the shooting of Oswald. Ruby's account of how he
entered the basement by the Main Street ramp merits consideration in determining
his means of entry. Three Dallas policemen testified that approximately 80
minutes after his arrest, Ruby told them that he had walked to the top of the
Main Street ramp from the nearby Western Union office and that he walked down
the ramp at the time the police car driven by Lieutenant Pierce emerged into
Main Street. This information did not come to light immediately because the
policemen did not report it to their superiors until some days later. Ruby
refused to discuss his means of entry in interrogations with other investigators
later on the day of his arrest. Thereafter, in a lengthy interview on December
21 and in a sworn deposition taken after his trial, Ruby gave the same
explanation he had given to the three policemen.
The
Main Street ramp provided the most direct route to the basement from the Western
Union office. At normal stride, it requires approximately 1 minute to walk from
that office to the top of the Main Street ramp and about 20-25 seconds to
descend the ramp. It is certain, therefore, that Ruby entered the basement no
more than 2-3 minutes before the shooting. This timetable indicates that a
little more than 2 of the 4 minutes between Ruby's departure from the Western
Union office and the time of the shooting are unaccounted for. Ruby could have
consumed this time in loitering along the way, at the top of the ramp, or inside
the basement. However, if Ruby is correct that he passed Pierce's car at the top
of the ramp, he could have been in the basement no more than 30 seconds before
the shooting.
Police vehicles in the basement were inspected during the
course of the search supervised by Sergeant Dean. According to Patrolman Vaughn,
the only vehicles that entered the basement while he was at the top of the Main
Street ramp were two patrol cars, one of which entered twice, and a patrol wagon
which was searched by another policeman after it entered the basement. All
entered on official police business and considerably more than 4 minutes before
Oswald was shot. None of the witnesses at the top of the Main Street ramp
recalled any police car entering the basement in the 4-minute period after Ruby
left the Western Union office and preceding the shooting. The possibility that
Ruby could have entered the basement in a car may therefore be completely
discounted. The Dallas Police Department, concerned at the failure of its
security measures, conducted an extensive investigation that revealed no
information indicating complicity between any police officer and Jack Ruby. Ruby
denied to the Commission that he received any form of assistance. The FBI
interviewed every member of the police department who was on duty in the
basement on November 24, and Commission staff members took sworn depositions
from many. With few exceptions, newsmen who were present in the basement at the
time also gave statements and/or depositions. As the record before the
Commission indicated, Ruby had had rather free access to the Dallas police
quarters during the period subsequent to the assassination, but there was no
evidence that implicated the police or newsmen in Ruby's actions on that day.
Adequacy of Security Precautions
The shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald
obviously resulted from the failure of the security precautions which the Dallas
Police Department had taken to protect their prisoner. In assessing the causes
of the security failure, the Commission has not overlooked the extraordinary
circumstances which prevailed during the days that the attention of the world
was turned on Dallas. Confronted with a unique situation, the Dallas police took
special security measures to insure Oswald's safety.
There were many possible reasons why people might have attempted
to kill him if given the opportunity. Concerned that there might be an attempt
on Oswald's life, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a message to Chief Curry on
November 22 through Special Agent Manning C. Clements of the FBI's Dallas
office, urging that Oswald be afforded the utmost security. Curry does not
recall receiving the message.
...as a Department
we deal with public affairs. It is the right of the public to know about these
affairs, and one of the most accurate and useful avenues we have of supplying
this information is through the newspapers and radio and television stations.
Implied in the General Order is a prohibition for the Officer to improperly
attempt to interfere with the news media representative, who is functioning in
his capacity as such. Such activity on the part of any Police Officer is
regarded by the press as an infringement of rights, and the Department shares
this view.
Under this policy, news representatives ordinarily had access to the
Police and Courts Building. The first newsmen to arrive on Friday afternoon were
admitted in accordance with the policy; others who came later simply followed
behind them. Shortly after Oswald arrived, Captain King granted permission to
bring television cameras to the third floor. By the time the unwieldy
proportions of the crowd of newsmen became apparent, it had already become well
entrenched on the third floor. No one suggested reversing the department's
policy expressed in General Order No. 81. Chief Curry testified that at no time
did he consider clearing the crowd from the building; he "saw no particular harm
in allowing the media to observe the prisoner." Captain King later stated
candidly that he simply became "accustomed to the idea of them being out there."
The general policy of the Dallas police recognized that the rule of full
cooperation did not apply when it might jeopardize an investigation. In
retrospect, most members of the department believed that the general rule
allowing admittance of the press to the police quarters should not have been
followed after the assassination. Few, if any, thought this at the time. By
failing to exclude the press from the building on Friday and Saturday, the
Dallas police made it possible for the uncontrolled crowd to nearly surround
Oswald on the frequent occasions that he moved through the third floor corridor.
The decision to allow newsmen to observe the transfer on Sunday followed
naturally the policy established during these first 2 days of Oswald's
detention. The reporters and cameramen descended upon the third floor of the
Police and Courts Building in such numbers that the pressroom on the third floor
proved wholly inadequate. Rather than the "two or three or maybe a half dozen
reporters" who normally appeared to cover local police stories, the police were
faced with upward of 100. Bringing with them cameras, microphones, cables, and
spotlights, the newsmen inevitably spilled over into areas where they interfered
with the transaction of police business and the maintenance of security.
The near-blinding
television and motion picture lights which were allowed to shine upon the escort
party further increased the difficulty of observing unusual movements in the
basement. Moreover, by making public the plans for the transfer, the police
attracted to the city jail many persons who otherwise might not have learned of
the move until it had been completed. This group included the onlookers gathered
on Commerce Street and a few people on Main Street. Also, continuous television
and radio coverage of the activities in the basement might have resulted in
compromise of the transfer operation. These risks to Oswald's safety, growing in
part out of adherence to the general policy of the police department, were also
accepted for other reasons. Many members of the police department believed that
the extraordinary public attention aroused by the tragic death of President
Kennedy obliged them to make special efforts to accommodate the press. Captain
King carefully articulated one reason why the newsmen were permitted
We realized that if we
arrested a suspect, that if we brought him into the police station and then
conducted all of our investigations behind closed doors, that if we gave no
reports on the progress of our investigation and did not permit the newsmen to
see the suspectif we excluded them from itwe would leave ourselves open not only
to criticisms that we were fabricating a suspect and were attempting to pin
something on someone, but even more importantly, we would cause people to lose
faith in our fairness and, through losing faith in our fairness, to lose faith
to a certain extent in the processes of law. We felt it was mandatory that as
many people knew about it as possible. We knew, too, that if we did exclude the
newsmen, we would be leaving ourselves open to a charge that we were using
improper action, duress, physical abuse, all of these things.
While Oswald was in custody, the Dallas police kept the press informed
about the treatment Oswald was receiving.
The public could have been assured
that the prisoner was not mistreated and that his rights were fully respected by
the police, without each one of hundreds of cameramen and reporters being
permitted to satisfy himself that the police had not abused the prisoner. This
result could have been accomplished by obtaining reports from members of the
family who visited him, or by a committee of the bar or other substantial
citizens of the community. When it became known on Saturday that Oswald did not
have an attorney, the president of the Dallas Bar Association visited him to
inquire whether he wished assistance in obtaining counsel.
News Coverage and Police Policy
Consistent with its policy of allowing
news representatives to remain within the working quarters of the Police and
Courts Building, the police department made every effort to keep the press fully
informed about the progress of the investigation. As a result, from Friday
afternoon until after the killing of Oswald on Sunday, the press was able to
publicize virtually all of the information about the case which had been
gathered until that time. In the process, a great deal of misinformation was
disseminated to a worldwide audience. (For some examples see app. XII.) As
administrative assistant to Chief Curry, Captain King also handled departmental
press relations and issued press releases. According to King, it was "the
responsibility of each member of the department to furnish to the press
information on incidents in which they, themselves, were involved, except on
matters which involved ... personnel policies of the department, or ... unless
it would obviously interfere with an investigation underway." In Oswald's case,
Chief Curry released most of the information to. the press. He and Assistant
Chief Batchelor agreed on Friday that Curry would make all announcements to the
press. However, there is no evidence that this decision was ever communicated to
the rest of the police force. The chief consequence appears to have been that
Batchelor refrained from making statements to the news media during this period.
Most of the information was disclosed through informal oral statements or
answers to questions at impromptu and clamorous press conferences in the third
floor corridor. Written press releases were not employed. The ambulatory press
conference became a familiar sight during these days. Whenever Curry or other
officials appeared in the hallway, newsmen surrounded them, asking questions and
requesting statements. Usually the officials complied. (See Commission Exhibit
No. 2632, p. 232.) Curry appeared in interviews on television and radio at least
a dozen times during November 22-24. He did not attend any of the interrogations
of Oswald in Captain Fritz' office except at the beginning and toward the end of
Sunday morning's session; he received his information through Captain Fritz and
other sources. Nevertheless, in sessions with the newsmen on Friday and Saturday
he gave detailed information on the progress of the case against Oswald.
Recorded statements of television and radio interviews with Curry and other
officials in Dallas during November 22-24 have been transcribed and included in
the record compiled by the Commission. An example of these interviews is the
following transcript of remarks made by Curry to newsmen on Saturday:
A. Yes, we've just been informed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, that they, the FBI, have the order letter from
a mail order house, and the order was sent to their laboratory in Washington and
the writing on this order was compared with known samples of our suspect,
Oswald's handwriting and found to be the same.
Q. This order was for the
rifle?
A. This order was for the rifle to a mail order house in Chicago. It
was [inaudible]. The return address was to Dallas, Texas, to the post office box
under the name of A. Hidell, H-I-D-E-double L. This is the post office box of
our suspect. This gun was mailed parcel post March 20, 1963. I understand he
left Dallas shortly after this and didn't come back until I think about two
months ago.
Q. Do you know again on what date this rifle was ordered and are
you able to link it. definitely as the rifle which you confiscated at the School
Book Depository?
A. That we have not done so far. If the FBI has been able
to do it I have not been informed of it yet. We do know that this man ordered a
rifle of the type that was used in the assassination of the President from this
mail order house in Chicago and the FBI has definitely identified the writing as
that of our suspect
Q. On another subjectI understand you have photographs
of the suspect, Oswald, with a rifle like that used. Could you describe that
picture?
A. This is the picture of Oswald sanding facing a camera with a
rifle in his hand which is very similar to the rifle that we have in our
possession. He also had a pistol strapped on his hip. He was holding two papers
in his hand, with one of them seemed to be The Worker and the other says Be
MilitantI don't know whether that was headlines or the name of the paper.
Q.
How much did the gun cost from the mail order house?
A. I understand the gun
was advertised for $12.78, I believe.
Q. Have you received any results on the
ballistics test conducted on the gun and on Oswald?
A. They're going to be
favorable. I don't have a formal report yet.
Q. But you are sure at this time
they will be favorable?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you feel now that you have the case
completely wrapped up, or are you continuing?
A. We will continue as long as
there is a shred of evidence to be gathered. We have a strong case at this
time.
Q. I believe you said earlier this afternoon that you have a new
development which does wrap up the casethe first time you said the case
definitely is secure. Is that correct?
A. That was this morning. This
additional evidence just makes a stronger case.
Q. But this is not the same
evidence you were referring to then?
A. No, that's true.
Q. Would you be
willing to say what that evidence was?
A. No, sir. I don't wish to reveal
it. It might jeopardize our case.
Commentator: Thank you very much Chief
Jesse Curry of the Dallas Police Department.
Although Captain Fritz permitted himself to be interviewed by the news
media less frequently than did Chief Curry, he nevertheless answered questions
and ventured opinions about the progress of the investigation. On Saturday he
told reporters that he was convinced beyond a doubt that Oswald had killed the
President. He discussed some of the evidence in the case, especially the rifle,
but his contribution to the knowledge of the reporters was small compared with
that of Chief Curry.
FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover became concerned because "almost as soon as ... [FBI
Laboratory reports] would reach the Dallas Police Department, the chief of
police or one of the representatives of the department would go on TV or radio
and relate findings of the FBI, giving information such as the identification of
the gun and other items of physical evidence." On Sunday, after Oswald was shot,
Hoover dispatched a personal message to Curry requesting him "not to go on the
air any more until this case ... [is] resolved." Hoover testified later that
Curry agreed not to make any more statements.
District Attorney Wade also held one more press conference. Before
doing so on Sunday evening, he returned once more to the police station and held
a meeting with "all the brass" except Curry. Wade told them that "people are
saying ... you had the wrong man and you all were the one who killed him or let
him out here to have him killed intentionally." Wade told the police that
"somebody ought to go out in television and lay out the evidence that you had on
Oswald, and tell them everything." He sat down and listed from memory items of
evidence in the case against Oswald. According to Wade, Chief Curry refused to
make any statements because he had told an FBI inspector that he would say no
more. The police refused to furnish Wade with additional details of the case.
Unfortunately, at that time, as he subsequently testified,
he lacked a thorough grasp of the evidence and made a number of errors. He
stated that Oswald had told a woman on a bus that the President had been killed,
an error apparently caused by the bus driver having confused Oswald with another
passenger who was on the bus after Oswald had left. Wade also repeated the error
about Oswald's having a map marked with the route of the motorcade. He told
reporters that Oswald's description and name "went out by the police to look for
him." The police never mentioned Oswald's name in their broadcast descriptions
before his arrest.
Q. Where?
A. In Oak Cliff. I don't
have the exact place and went to his home in Oak Cliff, changed his clothes
hurriedly and left.
In this manner, a section of Dallas, "Oak Cliff, " became a nonexistent
taxicab driver, "Darryl Click." Wade did not mention the cabdriver by name at
any time. In transcribing the conference from the sound tape, a stenographer
apparently made an error that might have become permanently imbedded in the
literature of the event but for the preservation and use of an original sound
tape. Though many of the inaccuracies were subsequently corrected by the police
and are negated by findings of the Commission included elsewhere in this report,
the publicizing of unchecked information provided much of the basis for the
myths and rumors that came into being soon after the President's death. The
erroneous disclosures became the basis for distorted reconstructions and
interpretations of the assassination. The necessity for the Dallas authorities
to correct themselves or to be corrected by other sources gave rise not only to
criticism of the police department's competence but also to doubts regarding the
veracity of the police. Skeptics sought to cast doubt on much of the correct
evidence later developed and to find support for their own theories in these
early police statements. The immediate disclosure of information by the police
created a further risk of injuring innocent citizens by unfavorable publicity.
This was the unfortunate experience of Joe R. Molina, a Dallas-born Navy veteran
who had been employed by the Texas School Book Depository since 1947 and on
November 22, 1963, held the position of credit manager. Apparently because of
Molina's employment at the Depository and his membership in a veterans'
organization, the American G.I. Forum, that the Dallas police considered
possibly subversive, Dallas policemen searched Molina's home with his
permission, at about 1:30 a.m., Saturday, November 23. During the day Molina was
intermittently interrogated at police headquarters for 6 or 7 hours, chiefly
about his membership in the American G.I. Forum, and also about Oswald. He was
never arrested, charged, or held in custody.
If
Oswald had been tried for his murders of November 22, the effects of the news
policy pursued by the Dallas authorities would have proven harmful both to the
prosecution and the defense. The misinformation reported after the shootings
might have been used by the defense to cast doubt on the reliability of the
State's entire case. Though each inaccuracy can be explained without great
difficulty, the number and variety of misstatements issued by the police shortly
after the assassination would have greatly assisted a skillful defense attorney
attempting to influence the attitudes of jurors. A fundamental objection to the
news policy pursued by the Dallas police, however, is the extent to which it
endangered Oswald's constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury.
Because of the nature of the crime, the widespread attention which it
necessarily received, and the intense public feelings which it aroused, it would
have been a most difficult task to select an unprejudiced jury, either' in
Dallas or elsewhere. But the difficulty was markedly increased by the divulgence
of the specific items of evidence with which the police linked Oswald to the two
killings. The disclosure of evidence encouraged the public, from which a jury
would ultimately be impaneled, to prejudge the very questions that would be
raised at trial. Moreover, rules of law might have prevented the prosecution
from presenting portions of this evidence to the jury.
Responsibility of News Media
While appreciating the heavy and unique
pressures with which the Dallas Police Department was confronted by reason of
the assassination of President Kennedy, primary responsibility for having failed
to control the press and to check the flow of undigested evidence to the public
must be borne by the police department. It was the only agency that could have
established orderly and sound operating procedures to control the multitude of
newsmen gathered in the police building after the assassination. The Commission
believes, however, that a part of the responsibility for the unfortunate
circumstances following the President's death must be borne by the news media.
The crowd of newsmen generally failed to respond properly to the demands of the
police. Frequently without permission, news representatives used police offices
on the third floor, tying up facilities and interfering with normal police
operations. Police efforts to preserve order and to clear passageways in the
corridor were usually unsuccessful. On Friday night the reporters completely
ignored Curry's injunction against asking Oswald questions in the assembly room
and crowding in on him. On Sunday morning, the newsmen were instructed to direct
no questions at Oswald; nevertheless, several report, were shouted questions at
him when he appeared in the basement.